Uganda Case Law

Rugira Salim v Jakobu Enterprises Ltd

Rugira Salim v Jakobu Enterprises Ltd (Civil Suit 2 of 2023) [2025] UGHC 358 (10 April 2025)

Court

High Court of Uganda

Case number

Civil Suit 2 of 2023

Judge

Emokor, J

The court determined that the plaintiff's claim for personal injuries resulting from negligence is time-barred under Section 3(1)(d) of the Limitation Act, as it was filed more than three years after the cause of action arose. However, the claim for loss of income and damages to the motor vehicle, which arises from negligence but does not include personal injuries, falls under Section 3(1)(a) and is subject to a six-year limitation period. Since the suit was filed within six years, this claim survives. The court, applying the principle of severance, rejected the time-barred personal injury cl…

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• Limitation Periods
• Negligence
• Personal Injury Claims
• Loss Of Income
• Special Damages

Kabuye v Crown Beverages Limited

Kabuye v Crown Beverages Limited (Civil Appeal 10 of 2018) [2018] UGHCCD 217 (26 October 2018)

Court

HC: Civil Division (Uganda)

Case number

Civil Appeal 10 of 2018

Judge

Musa Ssekaana, J

The High Court held that a workers’ compensation claim for permanent partial disability was time barred because the cause of action accrued on the accident date, not the later medical assessment.

• Workers Compensation
• Limitation Periods
• Personal Injury Claims
• Cause Of Action Accrual
• Workers-compensation
• Limitation-periods

Kayanja v Yekee and Another

Kayanja v Yekee and Another (Civil Suit No. 263/2003) [2008] UGHCCD 1 (8 April 2008)

Court

HC: Civil Division (Uganda)

Case number

Civil Suit No. 263/2003

Judges

Anne Magezi, j

The court held that the relevant provision for substitution is Order 24(3), which allows continuation of a suit only if the cause of action survives the death of the plaintiff. In personal injury claims, the cause of action does not survive the plaintiff, as the claim is inherently personal and requires proof of negligence and damages suffered by the injured party. The precedent in Pulling vs The Great Eastern Railway Company (1882) QBD, though not binding, was persuasive in establishing that tortious actions for personal injury abate upon the death of the claimant. Therefore, the application…

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• Substitution Of Parties
• Abatement Of Suit
• Survival Of Cause Of Action
• Personal Injury Claims

National Council of Sports v Sseruwagi

National Council of Sports v Sseruwagi (Miscellaneous Application No 305 of 2003) [2004] UGHC 17 (8 June 2004)

Court

High Court of Uganda

Case number

Miscellaneous Application No 305 of 2003

The court held that the respondent's claim for compensation for injuries sustained in 1984 is barred by limitation. The pain and ongoing treatment are manifestations of the original injury, not fresh injuries giving rise to new causes of action. The Limitation Act requires that actions for personal injuries be brought within three years of the accrual of the cause of action, which occurs when the plaintiff suffers more than minimal damage. The respondent's argument that the injury is continuous was rejected, as there was no evidence of new unlawful acts or fresh injuries. The court applied th…

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• Limitation Periods
• Personal Injury Claims
• Cause Of Action Accrual

James Katende,Yona Kato v Uganda Railways Corporation

James Katende,Yona Kato v Uganda Railways Corporation [1993] UGSC 6 (6 May 1993)

Court

Supreme Court of Uganda

The Supreme Court of Uganda dismissed an appeal arising from a train collision, holding that the appellants failed to prove they were lawful passengers or that their injuries were established.

• Negligence Liability
• Carrier Passenger Duty
• Personal Injury Claims
• Burden Of Proof
• Assessment Of Damages
• Negligence

Mugabi v Nyanza Textile Industries Limited

Mugabi v Nyanza Textile Industries Limited (Civil Suit 123 of 1989) [1992] UGHC 76 (6 February 1992)

Court

High Court of Uganda

Case number

Civil Suit 123 of 1989

Judge

Egonda-Ntende, J

The court held that the plaintiff's claim for personal injuries was barred by section 4 of the Limitation Act, as the cause of action arose no later than 1970 and the suit was filed more than three years after that date. The court rejected the argument that the cause of action was continuing, noting that permanent injury does not convert the cause of action into a continuing one once the defendant's acts or omissions have ceased. The court further found that the plaintiff's alleged ignorance of the cause of his ailment did not amount to a disability under section 22 of the Limitation Act, as…

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• Limitation Periods
• Personal Injury Claims
• Continuing Cause Of Action
• Disability Exception
• Pleading Requirements