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Uganda Judgment

Commercial Court of Uganda

Mariam Nassali v Angel K.K Sewamala (Miscellaneous Application 468 of 2002) [2002] UGCommC 26 (18 December 2002)

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01

Holding and result

The court found that the Objector was in possession of the property at the time of attachment, a fact not contradicted by the Respondent. Under the Civil Procedure Rules, possession is the crucial factor in objector proceedings, and the Objector's locus standi was established. The court held that disputes over ownership or the genuineness of the transfer are not for determination in objector proceedings but may be pursued in a separate suit. Accordingly, the Objector was entitled to an order releasing the property from attachment.

Court disposition

application granted

Orders

  • The property comprised in Kibuga Block 11, Plot 1122 at Kabowa is released from attachment.
  • Costs of the application are awarded to the Objector against the Respondent.

02

Material facts

Parties

Mariam Nassali

Applicant

Angel Sewamala K. K.

Respondent Counsel: Joseph Matsiko SSA (brief for Kiyemba Mutale Esq)

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Miscellaneous Application / Objector Proceedings; Ruling on Application to Release Attached Property

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The Objector argued she was the bona fide purchaser and registered owner of the property, having acquired it after repaying the previous owner's loan to Greenland Bank. She asserted she was in possession at the time of attachment and had no dealings with the Respondent. The attachment was therefore wrongful and the property should be released.
Respondent
The Respondent challenged the Objector's title and the timing of the transfer, alleging the Objector was not the registered proprietor at the time of application and that the transfer was made after attachment. He disputed the genuineness of the loan repayments and argued the Objector lacked locus standi, as she had transferred the property to a third party before filing the application.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Order 19, Rules 55, 56, 57, Civil Procedure Rules; Joseph Mulenga v FIBA (U) Ltd, High Court M.A. No. 308/96

    In objector proceedings, the dispositive consideration is possession of the property at the time of attachment, not ownership.

  2. 02

    Order 19, Rule 60, Civil Procedure Rules

    A party against whom an order is made in objector proceedings may institute a suit to establish ownership rights.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court found that the Objector was in possession of the property at the time of attachment, a fact not contradicted by the Respondent. Under the Civil Procedure Rules, possession is the crucial factor in objector proceedings, and the Objector's locus standi was established. The court held that disputes over ownership or the genuineness of the transfer are not for determination in objector proceedings but may be pursued in a separate suit. Accordingly, the Objector was entitled to an order releasing the property from attachment.

Obiter and limits

  • Whether the alleged transfer of ownership or registration of a third party is genuine or fraudulent is not for determination in objector proceedings; such matters may be litigated separately.
  • The explanation regarding the deposit slips and loan repayments raised a triable issue that should be heard on its merits in an appropriate forum.

Court disposition

application granted

  • The property comprised in Kibuga Block 11, Plot 1122 at Kabowa is released from attachment.
  • Costs of the application are awarded to the Objector against the Respondent.

Source and reliance status

Commercial Court of Uganda

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Judgment text

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Source document

Commercial Court of Uganda

Judgment

[2002] UGCommC 26

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (COMMERCIAL COURT) MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 468 OF 2002 (Arising from Civil Suit No. 1096 of 1999)

| MARIAM<br>NASSALI | APPLICANT/OBJECTOR | |---------------------------|------------------------------| | VERSUS | | | ANGEL<br>SEWAMALA<br>K. K. | RESPONDENT/JUDGMENT-CREDITOR |

BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JAMES OGOOLA

RULING

This is an Objector proceeding brought by Ms Mariam Nassali (the "Objector") against Mr. Sewamala, in whose favour judgment in an earlier suit (HCCS No. 1096/99) was entered (herein referred to as the "Judgment Creditor"). The application is brought under 0.19,rr.55, 57 and 58 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), and is supported by an affidavit of 05/08/02 deponed by the Objector. It seeks a Court order to release from attachment certain property, comprised in Kibuga Block 11, Plot <sup>1122</sup> at Kabowa, Kampala - on the grounds specified in the Objector's affidavit, namely:

- (a) That the Objector is the *bona fide* purchaser of the suit property, and the duly registered owner thereof - as evidenced by the Certificate of Title (Annexture "A" to that affidavit). - (b) That she purchased that property from the former registered proprietor, one Mohammed Sewankambo (the Judgment Debtor in the above HCCS 1096/99), who had mortgaged the property to GREENLAND BANK as security for a loan, which loan he failed to repay. - (c) That upon GREENLAND BANK'<sup>S</sup> liquidation, the Liquidator (Bank of Uganda) threatened to sell the suit property by public auction; whereupon the Objector salvaged the property by repaying Sewankambo's loan, and the Bank of Uganda released the mortgage on the title to the suit property. Thereafter, the Objector became the registered proprietor of that property (on 23/10/00).

(d) That on 11/07/02, the Objector learnt that the suit property had been attached pursuant to an order of attachment under HCCS No. 1096/99 in favour of the Respondent, who was a creditor of Mr. Sewankambo, in a completely different transaction from the one involving the above GREENLAND BANK loan and mortgage.

In his oral submission, learned counsel for the Objector contended that the Objector has never been a party to Respondent's suit No. 1096/99 against Sewankambo; and had never had any other dealing(s) with the Respondent. Conversely, ever since the transfer by Bank of Uganda of the title to the suit property into Respondent's names, Mr. Sewankambo (the Judgement Debtor in HCCS No. 1096/99) no longer has any proprietary interest in the suit property. Accordingly, counsel concluded, the attachment of the Objector's property was wrong. The property ought to be released from the attachment.

In his affidavit-in-reply, the Respondent challenges the date on which the Objector transferred the suit land into his names. The Respondent depones that a careful search of the Land Office reveals that by 6/08/02 (the date of this instant application) the Objector was not the registered proprietor of the suit property. Moreover, the Objector purportedly transferred the land to a third party only after the issuance of the Warrant of Execution, and after the attachment of the property by the Court Bailiff. Such a transfer cannot be *bona fide* and the Court should not condone it. Lastly, the Respondent deponed that Mr. Sewankambo was not a borrower from GREENLAND BANK and, accordingly, the Objector could not possibly have "salvaged" the title as alleged.

In his submissions, learned counsel for the Respondent emphasised that indeed at the time of filing this application (i.e. on 6/08/02), a Mr. DAN KUGAMBWA (and not the Objector) was the registered proprietor of the suit property - as evidenced by the entry on the Land Title showing Kugambwa's ownership with effect from 30/7/02 (that is one whole week before the filing date of this application). Secondly, learned counsel contented that the alleged repayments by the Objector of Sewankambo's bank debt are false in as much as the deposit slips indicate that the deposits were credited to the Savings Accounts of either "Nassali Miriam" or of "POPCO" - rather than to the Loan Account of Sewankambo. Thirdly, on the transfer form (Annexture "G" to Respondent's affidavit in reply), the Objector stated "natural love and affection" to be the consideration for the transfer of the suit

property from Sewankambo to the Objector. This is totally at variance with the Objector's sworn affidavit to the effect that she "purchased" that land from Sewankambo through repayments of Sewankambo's outstanding bank loan from GREEN LAND. Fourthly, learned counsel contended that the Objector has no locus standi to make this application in as much as she ceased to have any interest in the suit property on 30/7/2002 (the date of Kugambwa's registration as proprietor of that land).

In its ruling, this Court will consider the question of locus standi first. We can be extremely brief on this point. It is trite law that in Objector Proceedings under 0.19, rr.55, 56 and 57 of the CPR, the crucial and, I dare say, dispositive consideration is one of possession of the property at the time of the attachment. If the Objector was in possession $-$ or if some other person was in possession on account of the Objector – then the property should be released from attachment - see, for instance, Joseph Mulenga v FIBA (U) Ltd, High Court M. A. No. 308/96; see also r.57 of 0.19 of the CPR. In the instant application the Objector stated quite categorically in paragraph 12 of her affidavit in support that:

> "... at the time the attachment order was issued I was in possession and active control of the property."

Moreover, in paragraph 9 of the same affidavit, the Objector deponed that:

"... the Defendant/Judgment Debtor in the said suit [i.e. Mr. Sewankambo] no longer has any interest whether legal or equitable in the said property given the fact that I took over ownership after completion of payment of the loan monies to Bank of Uganda and I am now the registered proprietor of the property."

The fact or assertion of the Objector's possession of the suit property at the time of the attachment, was never contradicted or even challenged in the Respondent's affidavit in reply. Indeed, while counsel for the Objector stressed the same point in his submissions, counsel for the Respondent never contradicted that assertion. In light of the above, Court finds as a fact that the Objector was in possession of the suit property at the time of the attachment of that property. Accordingly, not only did the Objector have locus standi to

bring this application; she is indeed for that reason, entitled to an order of this Court releasing the property from attachment.

The above finding and conclusions are dispositive of the matter at hand. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, <sup>I</sup> will also address the two issues raised by the Respondent.

First, Respondent challenged the genuiness of the Objector's repayments of Sewankambo's bank loan, in as much as the deposit slips seemed to credit the Savings Account of either the Objector herself or of POPCO - rather than the Loan Account of Sewankambo. The Objector's response to this was an admission that indeed some of the deposit slips had that effect, but that a large number of other deposit slips did repay Sewankambo'<sup>s</sup> loan by crediting POPCO'<sup>s</sup> non-Savings Account - which Account constituted Sewankambo's Loan Account. <sup>I</sup> find this explanation quite reasonable. Moreover, learned counsel for the Respondent did not in any way whatsoever contradict, or even challenge, that explanation. In the event, the Objector appears to have raised here a triable issue that should, in all fairness, be heard on its merits.

Second, Respondent challenged the genuiness of the entries on the Land Title to the suit property - in particular regarding the entry thereon of Mr. Dan Kugambwa as the proprietor of the suit land starting from 30/07/02. Whether this challenge is or is not a viable argument must be heard on its merits. However, this application, being an application for Objector proceedings, is not the appropriate occasion for consideration of the merits of that issue - as the challenge is to the ownership of the property (and not its possession). The Respondent is free to sue on issues of ownership. As is made abundantly clear, by r.60 of 0.19 of the CPR which states that:

> " *Where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute. "* [emphasis added]

It is quite clear that the scheme of our rules of procedure (rules 57 and 58 of 0.19 of the CPR) recognise possession as the crucial consideration for release from attachment in objector proceedings, while other rules (e.g. rule 60 of 0.19) govern other issues in dispute (such as the rightful ownership of the disputed property). Accordingly, whether the alleged

transfer of ownership of the suit property from Sewankambo to the Objector - including the purported registration of Dan Kugambwa, are genuine or a fraud, and whether or not the Objector and Sewankambo have conspired to defeat the course of justice - are maters that the Respondent is free to sue the Objector or anybody else, outside the instant application.

In the result, the application is granted. The property comprised in Kibuga Block 11, Plot 1122 at Kabowa shall and is hereby released from attachment. The costs of this application are awarded to the Objector (against the Respondent).

Ordered accordingly.

18/12/02 James Ogoola JUDGE

DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT, BEFORE:

Mr. Joseph Matsiko SSA (brief for Kiyemba Mutale Esq) - Counsel for the Respondent J. M. Egetu - Court Clerk

> 18/12/02 James Ogoola JUDGE

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Joseph Mulenga v FIBA (U) Ltd, High Court M.A. No. 308/96

Case cited

Civil Procedure Rules, Order 19, Rules 55, 56, 57, 58, 60

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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