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Uganda Judgment

High Court of Uganda

Transocean (U) Limited v Katende, Ssempebwa & Co. Advocates (Miscellaneous Appeal 30 of 1994) [1994] UGHC 66 (21 June 1994)

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01

Holding and result

The application for stay of execution was incompetent because it was brought under the wrong procedural law. Section 61(5) of the Advocates Act specifically governs stay of execution in appeals against taxation orders, and the application should have been made under that provision, not under the Civil Procedure Rules or Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act. The court declined to exercise its inherent powers to stay execution, as there were no justifying circumstances and the procedural defect was fundamental. Consequently, the application was struck out with costs to the respondent, and any interim stay order previously granted lapsed.

Court disposition

application struck out as incompetent

Orders

  • The application for stay of execution is struck out with costs to the respondent.
  • The interim stay order previously granted lapses.

02

Material facts

Parties

Transocean (H) T. TD.

Appellant Counsel: Mr. Mwesigwa

Katende, Ssempebwa & Co. Advocates

Respondent Counsel: Mr. Wateema

Amounts and remedies

  • Costs Awarded to Respondent: UGX 0

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Miscellaneous Appeal / Application for Stay of Execution

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
Counsel for the appellant argued that the application was properly before the court under Order 19 Rule 26 of the Civil Procedure Rules and, alternatively, Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act. He maintained that the summons cited the relevant provisions and that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Respondent
Counsel for the respondent contended that the application was not properly before the court, as the procedure adopted was incorrect. He argued that Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act was inapplicable where there was a specific law, namely Section 61(5) of the Advocates Act, which governs stay of execution in taxation matters. He further submitted that there was no suit pending between the parties, making the application incompetent.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Section 61(5) of the Advocates Act, 1970

    An appeal or reference under Section 61 of the Advocates Act does not operate as a stay of execution unless the taxing officer or a judge so orders.

  2. 02

    Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act

    Where a specific statutory provision governs procedure, general provisions such as Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act do not apply.

  3. 03

    Order 39 Rule 4(1) of Civil Procedure Rules and Section 61(5) of Advocates Act

    Applications for stay of execution in taxation matters should be made under the Advocates Act, not the Civil Procedure Rules.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The application for stay of execution was incompetent because it was brought under the wrong procedural law. Section 61(5) of the Advocates Act specifically governs stay of execution in appeals against taxation orders, and the application should have been made under that provision, not under the Civil Procedure Rules or Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act. The court declined to exercise its inherent powers to stay execution, as there were no justifying circumstances and the procedural defect was fundamental. Consequently, the application was struck out with costs to the respondent, and any interim stay order previously granted lapsed.

Obiter and limits

  • The application for stay of execution ought preferably to begin with the taxing officer, as indicated by the wording of Section 61(5) of the Advocates Act.
  • The court's inherent powers to stay execution are reserved for cases where failure to do so would cause utter injustice, which was not demonstrated in this case.

Court disposition

application struck out as incompetent

  • The application for stay of execution is struck out with costs to the respondent.
  • The interim stay order previously granted lapses.

Source and reliance status

High Court of Uganda

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Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

High Court of Uganda

Judgment

[1994] UGHC 66

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO. 30 OF 1994 $TRANSOCEAN(H)$ T. TD. ..... APPELLANT. VERSUS

Han Au Justice Eyanda Nitemale

KATENDE, SSEMPEBWA & CO. ADVOCATES .......... RESPONDENT. BEFORE:- The Honourable Mr. Justice J. W. N. Tsekooko

ORDER

$\langle \rangle$

This matter was instituted by Chamber Summons under the provisions of 0.19 Rules 26 and 89 (1) of Civil Procedure Rules and S. 101 of the Civil Procedure Act. The summons seeks for an order to stay execution of the taxation costs order issued by taxing officer dated 9th March, 1994 the day of taxation. There is an appeal filed in objection to the order of taxation persuant to S. 61 of the Advocates Act, 1970 and Rule 3 of the Taxation of Costs (Appeals & References) Rules.

The application is supported by affidavit of Mr. Beisa sworn on 24th March, 1994. The respondent swore affidavit in reply through Mr. Buwule, Advocate.

At the start of the hearing I asked Mr. Mwesigwa counsel for the appellant to satisfy me that the application was properly before the court as it was instituted under 0.19 Rule 26 of Civil Procedure Rules.

Learned counsel submitted that the application was properly before the court and that in any case the summons had cited S. 101 of Civil Procedure Act as an alternative procedural law.

For the respondent, Mr. Wateema submitted that the application is not properly before the court. That the procedure adopted is wrong. He further submitted that S. 101 of Civil

$...$ /2

procedure Act was inapplicable where there is <sup>a</sup> specific law, which is S. <sup>61</sup> (5) of the Advocates Act. Mr. Wateema's objection is mainly on the basis that in this case there is no suit pending between the parties. <sup>A</sup> suit in the Advocates Act is by S. <sup>82</sup> defines in same way as under S. <sup>2</sup> of Civil Procedure Act.' But that doesn't help the applicant in my view, whatever the case.

The appeal was instituted under Section <sup>61</sup> (1) of the Advocates Act, 1970\* .. It. appears to me that it is subsection 5 of that section which governs stay of executions.

S. <sup>61</sup> (5) states:

"An appeal or reference under the provisions of this section shall not act as <sup>a</sup> stay of execution unless the taxing officer or a judge so orders'1. This subsection has the same effect and operates as Order 39 Rule <sup>4</sup> (1) of Civil Procedure Rules with the consequence that actually the application for stay of execution of the taxing officer's Orders should have been made under S. 6\*1'(5) of Advocates Act and not under the Civil Procedure Rules.

I have not seen any provision in the Advocates Act, 1970 which suggests any contrary view.

I should also observe that from the wording of S. <sup>61</sup> (5) the- application for stay of execution ought preferrably to begin V/ith the taxing officer.

In the circumstances I agree with Mr. Wateeba that the application is not properly before this court.

I am aware that I have inherent powers to stay executions of the Court's orders. But this course would be resorted to where failure to do so would cause utter injustice. I am not persuaded that there are justifying circumstances for my exercise of inherent powers to stay the orders where the application for stay is brought under a wrong law.

.........../3

*f'*

In conclusion I think that the application is incomptent. I don't therefore need to consider the rest of the submissions. The application is accordingly struck out with costs to the respondent. That means my interim stay order lapses-.

*k-'-e <sup>1</sup> '* TSEKOOKO

J <sup>U</sup> <sup>D</sup> G- <sup>E</sup> 20/6/1994.

21/6/1994 at 9.04 a.m. Applicant absent. Sekabanja for applicant. Kawesa for respondent. Muyanja court clerk.

& /' - J. W-4. TSEKOOKO

JUDGE 21/6/1994

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Section 61(5) of the Advocates Act, 1970

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Order 19 Rule 26 of the Civil Procedure Rules

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Order 39 Rule 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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