Rex v Tanywamugwabi (Cr. App. 74/1938.) [1933] EACA 21 (1 January 1933)

COURT OF APPEAL FOR EASTERN AFRICA.

Before SIR JACOB BARTH, C. J., THOMAS, J., and GAMBLE, Ag. J. (Kenya).

$REX$ (Respondent)

SOWEDI KAUTA S/O TANYWAMUGWABI (Appellant). Cr. App. 74/1933.

(From Cr. C. 8/1933 of H. M. High Court of Uganda at Mbale.)

- Uganda Criminal Procedure Code, section 134 (Kenya Code, section 132)—Joinder of charges—Duplicity of counts—Two separate offences in one count—Conviction quashed and new trial ordered. - Held (21-7-33).—That the information was bad in law in that it charged the accused in one count with two distinct offences, and the con-<br>viction must be quashed and a retrial ordered. Rex v. Molloy<br>(1921), $\Sigma$ K. B. 364, and Rex v. Disney (1933), 24 Cr. App. Reports 49, referred to.

Branigan, Acting Crown Counsel, for the Attorney General of Uganda.

Appellant absent, unrepresented.

JUDGMENT.—This appeal is from a conviction for murder by the High Court of Uganda. The information charged the appellant with murdering two women, in one count. The judgment finds the appellant guilty of murder without specifying the person or persons in respect of whom the finding is given.

Reference has been made to Rex v. Disney (1933), C. A. R.; and Rex v. Molloy (1921), 2 K. B.

364.

Both of these cases deal with the impropriety of charging alternative charges on the same facts in one count. In this case, two murders were committed in what was the same transaction, but section 134, Criminal Procedure Code of Uganda, provides that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge or information, and goes on to provide in what circumstances more than one charge or information may be tried together. They are, inter alia, when more offences than one of the same kind committed within one year, any number not exceeding three may be tried together, and when in a series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction more offences than one are committed by the same person he may be charged with and tried at the same time for every such offence. These provisions do not, however, do away with the necessity of a separate charge or information in respect of each offence. This point does not arise out of the memorandum of appeal, but has been taken by the Court.

It is impossible to say that the appellant has not been prejudiced by the procedure adopted. We accordingly quash the conviction and sentence and order a new trial. In our opinion it is not desirable that more than one offence should be charged at the same trial when the punishment is death. $(R. V. Jones, 13)$ $C. A. R. 86.$ )