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East African Court of Appeal

Rex v Muini (Cr. Rev. Case No. 21 of 1938) [1938] EACA 190 (1 January 1938)

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01

Holding and result

The court held that the Medical Officer of Health exceeded his statutory powers by ordering the demolition of dwellings under section 119 of the Public Health Ordinance. Section 124 provides a specific procedure for demolition of dwellings, requiring a court order and additional safeguards for occupiers. The notices and subsequent proceedings regarding the dwellings were therefore ultra vires and a nullity, invalidating the convictions and sentences for those counts. However, the court found that the Medical Officer of Health was empowered under section 119 to order demolition of the butcher's shop, which was not a dwelling, and that the proceedings and conviction in respect of that building were valid. The court further held that, as the prosecution was a Crown prosecution, and there was no statutory exception, no costs could be ordered against the Crown.

Court disposition

Appeal allowed in respect of the first and third counts (dwellings); appeal dismissed in respect of the second count (butcher's shop).

Orders

  • Convictions, sentences, and orders regarding the two dwellings are set aside.
  • Conviction, sentence, and order regarding the butcher's shop stand.
  • No order as to costs against the Crown.

02

Material facts

Parties

Harrison Muini

Applicant Counsel: Hopley

Rex through the Medical Officer of Health, Kiambu

Respondent Counsel: Phillips

Amounts and remedies

  • Fine Per Charge: KES 20

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Criminal Revision / Revision of Conviction and Sentence by Second Class Magistrate, Kiambu

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicant argued that the Medical Officer of Health acted ultra vires by ordering demolition of dwellings under section 119 of the Public Health Ordinance, which does not empower such action. The applicant contended that the proper procedure for demolition of dwellings is set out in section 124, requiring a court order and specific safeguards. The applicant also challenged the validity of the convictions and sentences based on the improper procedure.
Respondent
The respondent, represented by Crown Counsel, maintained that the Medical Officer of Health acted within his powers under section 119 to abate nuisances, including ordering demolition. The respondent argued that the proceedings and convictions were valid and that the fines and demolition orders were lawfully imposed. The respondent further submitted that costs should not be awarded against the Crown.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124), sections 119, 124

    A Medical Officer of Health has no power under section 119 of the Public Health Ordinance to order demolition of a dwelling house to remove a nuisance; such power is reserved for the court under section 124.

  2. 02

    Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124), section 119

    The powers under section 119 include ordering demolition of buildings other than dwellings to abate a nuisance.

  3. 03

    Criminal Procedure Code, sections 88(2), 367

    Proceedings based on a fundamentally wrong procedure cannot be validated by general provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

  4. 04

    Common law; Criminal Procedure Code; Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124)

    At common law, the Crown neither receives nor pays costs unless expressly provided by statute.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court held that the Medical Officer of Health exceeded his statutory powers by ordering the demolition of dwellings under section 119 of the Public Health Ordinance. Section 124 provides a specific procedure for demolition of dwellings, requiring a court order and additional safeguards for occupiers. The notices and subsequent proceedings regarding the dwellings were therefore ultra vires and a nullity, invalidating the convictions and sentences for those counts. However, the court found that the Medical Officer of Health was empowered under section 119 to order demolition of the butcher's shop, which was not a dwelling, and that the proceedings and conviction in respect of that building were valid. The court further held that, as the prosecution was a Crown prosecution, and there was no statutory exception, no costs could be ordered against the Crown.

Obiter and limits

  • The legislature intended to distinguish between dwellings and other buildings in nuisance abatement, providing greater protection to occupiers of dwellings.
  • Hardship to residents is avoided by requiring court oversight and notice before demolition of dwellings.
  • General validating provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot cure proceedings fundamentally flawed from inception.

Court disposition

Appeal allowed in respect of the first and third counts (dwellings); appeal dismissed in respect of the second count (butcher's shop).

  • Convictions, sentences, and orders regarding the two dwellings are set aside.
  • Conviction, sentence, and order regarding the butcher's shop stand.
  • No order as to costs against the Crown.

Source and reliance status

East African Court of Appeal

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Judgment text

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Source document

East African Court of Appeal

Judgment

[1938] EACA 190

CRIMINAL REVISION

BEFORE THACKER, J. AND LANE, Ag. J.

REX THROUGH THE MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH, KIAMBU, Respondent (Original Prosecutor) υ

HARRISON MUINI, Applicant (Original Accused) Cr. Rev. Case No. 21 of 1938

Criminal Law-Nuisance-Insanitary dwellings-Insanitary buildings other than dwellings—Removal of nuisance—Demolition—Powers of Medical Officer of Health-Procedure-Public Health Ordinance, Cap. 124, secs. 119, 120 and 124—Criminal Procedure Code, secs. 88 (2), 166 (4), and 367—Costs against Crown.

The applicant, owner of three buildings of which one was a shop with living quarters attached, the second was a butcher's shop and the third was a dwelling house, was served with three sanitary notices under section 119 of the Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124) whereby a Medical Officer of Health declared that he was satisfied of the existence of a nuisance on each of the said premises and that the premises were of such construction and in such a state and so dirty as to be injurious or dangerous to health and required the applicant within one month from the service on him of the notices to abate and prevent recurrence of the said nuisances and for that purpose entirely to demolish the said premises, remove all materials and cleanse the site. On failure to comply with the notices the applicant was charged with three offences contra section 120 (1) of the Ordinance and was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Sh. 20 in respect of each charge and in addition he was given fourteen days in which to demolish all the said premises with provision for further penalty in case of default. The applicant applied for revision.

Held $(28-5-38)$ .—(1) That a local authority or medical officer of health has no power under the Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124) to order demolition of a dwelling house in order to secure the removal of a nuisance in respect of such building.

(2) That the powers vested in a medical officer under section 119 of the Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124) include the power to order the demolition of a building which is not a dwelling house.

(3) That the provisions of sections 88 (2) and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not be invoked to validate proceedings based on wrong premises from the start.

(Appeal allowed in respect of first and third counts; appeal dismissed in respect of the second count.)

Held further (2-6-38).—That the prosecution was a Crown prosecution and no case had been made out for ordering costs against the Crown.

Hopley for the applicant.

Phillips, Crown Counsel, for the Crown.

JUDGMENT.—The applicant applies for revision of the judgment, finding and sentence of the Second Class Magistrate, Kiambu, passed on the 24th day of February, 1938, on various grounds which we need not enumerate as they are set forth in some detail under thirteen heads in the grounds of revision dated 11th March, 1938.

The facts are that the Medical Officer of Health by three Notices dated 24th November, 1937, in which he stated that he was satisfied of the existence of a nuisance at the three sets of premises owned by the applicant and situate at the Wangigi Market in the Kiambu District, and that the said premises were of such construction and in such a state and so dirty as to be injurious or dangerous to health, thereupon required the applicant within one month from the date of services of the Notices to abate and prevent recurrence of the said nuisance, and for that purpose to entirely demolish the said premises, remove all materials and cleanse the site.

Now, these Notices purported to have been given under the provisions of section 119 of the Public Heatlh Ordinance, Cap.

124. This section empowers the Medical Officer of Health, if satisfied of the existence of a nuisance, to serve a notice on the author of the nuisance requiring him to remove it, and to execute such work as may be necessary for that purpose. By section 120 (1) if the person on whom the notice to remove a nuisance is served does not comply with any of the requirements thereof within the time specified, the Medical Officer of Health shall cause a complaint to be made before a magistrate and such magistrate shall thereupon issue a summons requiring the person on whom the notice was served to appear before his Court. By sub-section 2 of section 120, if the Court is satisfied that the alleged nuisance exists the Court shall make an Order on the author thereof requiring him to comply with the requirements of the notice and by sub-section 3 may impose a fine. The applicant did not comply with the notice referred to and thereupon on a complaint dated 29-1-38 a summons dated the 3rd February, 1938, was issued calling upon the applicant to answer a charge of failing to comply with the requirements of sanitary notices within the time specified in the notices contra section 120 (1), Cap.

124. The complaint came before the magistrate at Kiambu on the 23rd February, 1938. Here it may be mentioned that it was agreed that the three charges should all be heard together. The magistrate heard evidence from the Sanitary Inspector as to the existence of a nuisance and also evidence for the defendant that no nuisance in fact existed. The magistrate delivered judgment to the effect that a nuisance existed and that the only way to cure it was to demolish the buildings and that temporary measures would not be of any avail. He ordered the defendant to pay a fine of Sh. 20 on each charge and gave him fourteen days in which to demolish the buildings. Now section 124 of the Public Health Ordinance empowers the Court, where a nuisance is proved to exist with respect to a dwelling, and the Court is satisfied that such dwelling is so dilapidated and so defectively constructed that repairs to or alterations are not likely to remove the nuisance and make such dwelling fit for human habitation, to order the owner thereof to commence to demolish the dwelling on or before a specified date, being at least one month from the date of issuing the order. and to complete the demolition and to remove the materials from the site before another specified date.

Of the three sets of premises one was a shop having living quarters attached, the second was a butcher's shop, and the third was a small building used as living quarters. The first and third sets of premises therefore come within the category of dwellings while the second does not. There would appear to be a distinction in the Ordinance between the demolition of a dwelling and that of another class of building. A different procedure has to be adopted. in the case of a dwelling which it is sought to have pulled down by reason of a nuisance, to that which is necessary in the case of a building of another kind.

In this case the Medical Officer of Health himself issued the notices to demolish all three sets of premises acting under section 119. In regard to the butcher's shop, while it is nowhere laid down in the Ordinance that a Medical Officer of Health has specific powers to order the demolition of a building which is other than a dwelling, we hold not without some hesitation that the order to demolish appears to have been within the powers under section 119 enabling the Medical Officer of Health to order the removal of a nuisance.

The subsequent steps taken in regard to these premises (the butcher's shop) namely the filing of a complaint, the issue of a summons, the hearing of the charge by the magistrate, and the ultimate decision of the magistrate that a nuisance existed in respect of these premises and his order that they be demolished, and a fine be paid, appear to be without objection.

As regard the two dwellings the position is somewhat different.

Section 124 provides for the necessary procedure to be followed when power is sought to order demolition of a dwelling. The Public Health Ordinance being a penal enactment its provisions must be construed strictly. The section says in effect that when it is sought to demolish a dwelling, in order to cure a nuisance which can only be cured by such demolition, the Court is the proper authority to make the order. This by implication, in our opinion, deprives a Local Authority or Medical Officer of Health of the power of ordering the demolition of a dwelling. The words in section 119: "Requiring him to remove it within the time specified in the notice and to execute such work and do such things as may be necessary", cannot be taken to include the power to order demolition of a dwelling when special provision is made elsewhere, i.e. in section 124. In other words, the Medical Officer of Health in this instance had no power by notice to order the demolition of the two dwellings in order to secure the removal of the nuisance in respect of them. His action in doing so was ultra vires. His complaints and the summonses issued by the Court were based on the wrong section. In our opinion this invalidated the whole proceedings in the lower Court, including the convictions and sentences, in respect to the two dwellings. The whole procedure was wrong and the proceedings were a nullity. The

Medical Officer of Health's proper course we consider would have been to have sworn a complaint before the Court and to have moved the Court to issue a summons calling upon the owner to show cause why he should not be ordered to demolish under section 124. We do not think that the respondent ought to be allowed to call in aid section 88 (2) or section 367 Criminal Procedure Code. These provisions were not intended to validate proceedings based on wrong premises from the start. $\mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$

In our opinion the legislature, in cases where in order to remove a nuisance the demolition of a building is considered necessary, intended to discriminate between a dwelling and a building other than a dwelling. In the case of a dwelling there might clearly be a number of residents who would require time to look for other quarters. Hardship might be involved if the local authority or Medical Officer of Health had powers to order demolition within a given period. It was for this reason that special procedure is laid down. Section 124 first requires the Court to be satisfied by evidence that demolition is necessary; secondly, it gives power to the Court to order the owner to begin demolition on a date not less than a month from the date of the order and to complete it within a specified date; and thirdly it requires the Court to give notice to occupiers to vacate.

For these reasons the convictions, sentence and orders in regard to the two dwellings are set aside. The conviction, sentence and order in respect of the butcher's shop are to stand.

RULING.—First we hold that Dr. Bell, the Medical Officer of Health, Kiambu, instituted this case on behalf of the Crown and prosecuted it as a public prosecutor. He derived his authority as public prosecutor from section 166 (4), Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore it was a Crown prosecution.

Secondly, at common law the Crown neither receives nor pays costs. No statutory provision exists by virtue either of the Criminal Procedure Code or of the Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124) creating an exception to this principle.

No case has therefore been made out for the ordering of costs against the Crown in this revision case.

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Public Health Ordinance (Cap. 124), sections 119, 120, 124

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Criminal Procedure Code, sections 88(2), 166(4), 367

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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