Rex v Abdulhussein (Criminal Appeal (Case Stated) No. 153 of 1942) [1942] EACA 78 (1 January 1942)

APPELLATE CRIMINAL

BEFORE LUCIE-SMITH, J., AND HORNE, AG.

REX, Appellant ν.

KARIMBHAI ABDULHUSSEIN. Respondent Criminal Appeal (Case Stated) No. 153 of 1942

The Defence (Control of Prices) Regulations, 1942—Regulation 21—Refusing to furnish information.

Held (27-11-42).—The words "any information in relation to his trade or business" appearing in Regulation 19 (1) (c) are not limited by Regulation 6 (1) of the Regulations.

Brown, Solicitor General, for Appellant.

A. B. Patel and Inamidar for Respondent.

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JUDGMENT.—This is an appeal by way of case stated at the request of the Attorney General from the decision of the First Class Subordinate Court, Mombasa, acquitting the respondent upon a charge of refusing to furnish information relating to his trade or business required by the Price Controller.

The question put to this Court in the case stated is: $-$

"Whether or not the words 'any information in relation to his trade or business' which appear in Regulation 19 (1) (c) of the Defence (Control of Prices) Regulations, 1942, are limited by Regulation 6 (1) of the said Regulations, and whether or not the Subordinate Court came to a correct determination in point of law in holding that the aforesaid words are limited by Regulation 6 $(1)$ ."

The above question is not perhaps clearly stated and it may lead to some confusion if we attempt to answer it without reference to the facts of the case.

The Price Controller under the powers conferred on him by Regulation 19 (1) (c) required the respondent who is a trader in piece goods on a large scale to furnish him with information relating to all his transactions in grey unbleached cotton piece goods during the period from the 1st January, 1941, to the 20th July, 1942. With this request is a form which requires information as to each purchase and each sale during the period and the form appears designed to produce a record of the course of movement of the respondent's stocks of such goods during the period. The respondent filled up the return to show the purchases and sales for a period 1st July, 1942, to 20th July, 1942, and in defence to the charge of refusing to furnish the information relating to the earlier period submitted, in effect, that as he was not compelled by law to keep books which would show the information requested until these Regulations came into force on the 1st July, 1942, the Controller's power to require such information must, therefore, be limited to transactions arising after the 1st July, 1942. This submission was accepted by the learned Magistrate, who as a result read Regulation 6 with Regulation 19 (1) (c) and came to the conclusion that the Controller was not empowered to demand the information he did demand.

Regulation 19 (1) (c) empowers the Controller "to require any trader, manufacturer, producer, or commission agent to furnish verbally or in writing, and in such form as may be required, any information in relation to his trade or business.".

Regulation 6 (1) provides that traders shall keep accounts showing the stock of goods on hand as at the 1st July, 1942, and any stocks subsequently received. after that date, a reference to the source of supply of such stocks, and where any such stocks are disposed of a reference to the date of disposal, and in case of wholesale quantities a reference to the name of the person to whom the goods are transferred. Traders who have not kept such books heretofore are given fourteen days from 1st July, 1942; to comply with the above requirement.

In our opinion Regulation 6 making it compulsory upon traders to show certain information in their books from 1st July does not prevent the Controller from requesting a trader to furnish such information over the period 1st January, 1941, to 1st July, 1942. It may be that the trader may be unable to furnish that information; it may be so onerous upon the trader to furnish such information that a court in dealing with a charge of refusal to furnish information might come to the conclusion that the exercise of the power was so unreasonable as to show mala fides; but that is not the question here. All this Court is concerned with is whether Regulation 6 limits the words "any information in relation to his trade or business" which appear in Regulation 19 (1) (c). We can find no reason whatsoever for using Regulation $6$ (1) in this way. The only reason given in the judgment of the court below is that it seems contradictory that a controller may call for information when there was no compulsion to show that information in a particular form of book keeping. But though books are now compelled to be kept which show that information upon inspection it is not to say that the information did not exist prior to the 1st July, 1942, and cannot now be required by the Controller. It is obvious that a considerable portion of it must exist for before 1st July the respondent was compelled by

regulation to keep books showing costs and quantities of goods purchased and the costs of expenses, and by Regulation 7, he is prohibited from destroying books or documents relating to his business. The learned Magistrate's reasoning from the supposed case of a person who kept no books prior to the 1st July is therefore unsound, for it is based upon the case of a person who was committing an offence against the revoked regulations for which he would still be liable to the penalties provided.

The regulation making authority has seen fit to give wide powers of entry into premises, inspection, and to require information under Regulation 19, and when the other empowering regulations are examined, e.g. Regulations 4, 14 and 20 it would appear impossible to carry out the object of price control if the power to require information is restricted in the manner the Magistrate proposes. The words "any information in relation to his trade or business" are wide and necessarily so and it is not the duty of the Court to restrict their meaning or their application by reference to another regulation when there is no ambiguity in those words.

For these reasons we think the order of acquittal must be set aside and the case remitted to the Subordinate Court with a direction to hear and determine the complaint according to law.