International Development Consultants Ltd. v Muyanja & 2 Others (Miscellaneous Cause No.133 of 2018) [2019] UGHCCD 6 (1 March 2019)

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA

MISCELLANEOUS CAUSE NO.133 OF 2018

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS LIMITED---------- APPLICANT

VERSUS

- 1. JIMMY MUYANJA - 2. THE CENTRE FOR ARBITRATION & DISPUTE RESOLUTION (CADER) - -RESPONDENTS RAJESH DEWANI--------

BEFORE HON. JUSTICE SSEKAANA MUSA

RULING

The applicant filed an application for Judicial review seeking the following prerogative orders;

- 1. A declaration that the proceedings, ruling and orders of the $1^{st}$ respondent acting in his capacity as the Executive Director of the 2^nd respondent in CADER Misc. Appn. No. 67 of 2017 – International Development Consultants Ltd. v. AECOM (RoA) Pty S. A. Ltd. & Uganda National Roads Authority; are null and void and of no legal effect. - 2. An order of certiorari be issued to call for and quash the aforesaid proceedings, ruling and orders. - 3. A permanent injunction be issued to restrain the 1^st respondent from continuing to exercise the functions of an appointing authority under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act Cap 4. and/or all the functions exclusively reserved for the $2^nd$ respondent under Section 68 (a) of the same law.

- 4. A declaration thatthe 1st respondent's appointmentofthe 3rd respondentasanArbitratorpursuanttotherulingandordersofthe 1strespondentinthematterreferredtoin1.above;isnullandvoid andofnolegaleffect. - 5. Adeclarationthatalltheactsanddeedscommencedand/orcarried onbythe3rdrespondentpursuanttohisaforesaidappointmentasan Arbitratorarenullandvoidandofnolegaleffect. - 6. Apermanentinjunctionbeissuedtorestrainthe3rdrespondentfrom continuingtocarryonthefunctionsofanArbitratorpursuanttohis aforesaidappointment. - 7. Anorderofmandamusrequiringthe2ndrespondent;properlyandduly constitutedtotakeoverandreconsidertheapplicant'sapplicationfor theappointmentofanArbitratorfiledvideCADERMisc. Appn. No.67 of2017. - 8. Anorderforspecialandgeneraldamagesagainstthe1stand2nd respondentsjointlyand/orseverally. - 9. Costsofthisapplication.

ThegroundsuponwhichtheapplicationisbasedaresetoutintheNotice ofMotionandexpoundeduponintheaffidavitsofProf. Sam Tulya-Muhika theManagingDirectoroftheapplicant,Mr. AnthonyRwebandatheProjects Managerofthe applicantand Mr. OwinyBenard a law clerkin the employmentoftheapplicant'slawyers.

1. Theapplicantand 2 entitiesnamelyAECOM (RoA)PtyLtd and UgandaNationalRoadsAuthoritywerepartiesto acontractfor consultancyservicesfortheupgradingfrom gravelto (bitumen) standardofMpigi-Kanoni-SembabuleRoad(137Kms).

- 2. Duringthependencyofthesaidcontractadisputearosebetweenthe applicantononehandandthe2abovenamedentiesontheother hand. ThesaiddisputenecessitatedareferralthereoftoArbitrationin accordancewiththerelevantprovisionsoftheparties'contract. - 3. The parties failed to agree on the possible arbitrator,and the applicantapplied forappointmentofthe arbitratorvide CADER Misc. Appn. No.67of2017. - 4. Theaforesaidapplicationwasreceivedbythe1strespondentactingin hiscapacityastheExecutivedirectorofthe2ndrespondentandfixed byhimforhearingon20.11.2017. - 5. The hearing ofthe application was presided overby the 1st respondentsittingaloneon20.11.2017. Assoonashecalledthe matterforhearing,he took on a hostile attitude towards the applicant'srepresentativesand theircounsel. Hequestioned the veracityoftheapplicationandthreatenedtostrikeitoutongrounds thatthesamehadnotbeenaccompaniedbyacopyofacontract containingtheArbitrationclausedespitethefactthattheexistenceof thesaidcontractandarbitrationclausewasnotinissuebetweenthe partiestotheapplicationandasamatteroffact,thesameformed partofthedocumentswhichhehadbeforehim. - 6. Therespondentproceededtoheartheapplicationanddeliveredthe ruling. Theapplicantischallengingthe1st respondentforacting withoutjurisdictioninentertainingtheapplicationfortheappointment ofanarbitrator;suchjurisdictionisvestedonlyinthe2ndrespondent inaccordancewithsection68(a). - 7. Theapplicantcontendsthattheproceedings,rulingandordersmade thereinshouldbedeclarednullandvoidandvoidabinitioandofno legaleffectandshouldbequashedbyanorderofcertiorari.

The1strespondentinreplyoroppositiontothisapplicationfiledanaffidavit byJimmyMuyanjacontendedthat1stand2nd respondentareaJudicial OfficerandSubordinatecourtrespectively.

TheapplicationARB/CAD/67/2017InternationalDevelopmentConsultants LimitedvsAECOMRoA(Pty)LimitedandUgandaNationalRoadsAuthority wasreturnedbeforetheExecutiveDirectorpursuanttoamandateunder Section68oftheArbitrationandConciliationActcap4,albeitvariousother similarmattersbeforethe1stand2ndrespondents.

The1stand2nd respondentcontendedthattheapplicantisonlytryingto circumventsection9and11oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct.

Thatthe2nd respondent,likeallArbitrationscentreshasascaleoffees containedinitscompendium ofADRLawsthatallitsusersadheretoand issued underthe mandate underSection 68 ofthe Arbitration and ConciliationActandifanyexcessfeeswerepaid,arefundcanbemadeon dueprocessbytheapplicant.

The3rdrespondentinhisaffidavitinreplystatedthathewasappointedas sole arbitrator to preside over the Arbitral Proceedings in CAD/ARB/67/2017:INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTCONSULTANTSLTD vsAECOMRoALTD.

Thattherespondenthadnohandintheproceedingsandneitherdidhe makedecisioninthoseproceedings. Inadditionhehadnoroleandno participationinthemattersleadingtohisappointmentasArbitrator.

Thatuponbeinggiventhisappointment,the3rd respondentfiledand Arbitrator'sDeclarationofAcceptanceandaStatementofImpartiality.

Theapplicationfiledincourtdoesnotdiscloseanydecisiontakeninmy capacityasarbitratorthatshouldbesubjectofJudicialReview.

The3rdrespondentcontendedthatinterferencewithArbitralproceedingsby thisHonourablecourtisforbiddenexceptassetoutintheArbitrationand ConciliationAct. Thearbitralproceedingsbytheirnaturearenotamenable tojudicialreviewandapartyaggrievedbythedecisionofthearbitratormay applytosetitaside.

Issues

- 1. Whetherornotthecourthasjurisdictiontoentertainthecurrent application? - 2. Whetherornottheapplicationisproperlybroughtagainstthe3rd respondent? - 3. Whethertherulingandordersofthe1strespondentinCADERMisc. Appn. No.67of2017areamenabletojudicialreview? - 4. Whetherornotthe1strespondentactedlawfullywhenheentertained theapplicationtoappointanarbitrator? - 5. Whatremediesareavailabletotheparties?

Atthehearingofthisapplicationcourtdirectedthepartiestofilewritten submissionswhichtheyalldidandIhavereadandconsideredthem inthe processofwritingthisruling.

TheapplicantwasrepresentedbyMr. MurangiraArthurandthe1st&2nd respondentwasrepresentedbyMr. MugabiEnothwhilethe3rdrespondent wasrepresentedbyMr. PaulKuteesa.

ISSUE1

Whetherornotthecourthasjurisdictiontoentertainthecurrentapplication?

Theapplicant'scounselsubmittedthatthecourtisdulyempoweredwith the necessary jurisdiction to entertain this application. Firstly,the jurisdictionofthecourtonanapplicationforJudicialReviewisestablished byArt.42oftheConstitutionwhichprovides'arighttofairandjust treatmentforanypersonappearingbeforeanyadministrativeofficialor bodyandarighttoapplytocourtinrespectofanyadministrativedecision takenagainstanysuchperson.'ThejurisdictionisfurtheramplifiedbySect. 36(1)(a),(b)&(c)oftheJudicatureActCap13.andRules3(1)(a),(b)&(2) (a),(b) and (c) of The Judicature (JudicialReview) Rules,2009. Undoubtedlytherefore,thecourtisclothedwithjurisdictiontoentertainan applicationforjudicialreviewandtogranttheorderssought.

Themaincontentioninissueiswhetherthecourthasjurisdictionto entertainthecurrentapplicationinlightoftheprovisionsofSection9ofthe Arbitration&ConciliationActCap4(hereinafterreferredtoastheACA) whichprovidesthus;

'ExceptasprovidedinthisAct,nocourtshallinterveneinmattersgoverned bythisAct.'

Theaforesaidstatutoryprovisionandotherssimilartoitareknowninlaw as"ousterclauses."Theyoccurininstanceswherethelegislaturehaving conferreddecisionmakingpowersonadministrativebodiesmayseekto limit,precludeoroustcourt'sjurisdictiontoscrutinizethosepowers. The issuetheniswhetherinacasesuchthepresentone,Section9oftheACA canbereliedupontoexcludethejudicialreviewjurisdictionofthecourt?

The applicantcontended thatitthisprovision cannottake awaythe jurisdictionofcourttoentertainanapplicationforjudicialreview. According tothem,thebasisofthereasoningthatSection9oftheACAbeinga statutoryprovisionoflaw,isinferiortotheconstitutionalprovisionof Article42whichestablishesthecourt'sjudicialreviewjurisdiction.

Itwascounsel'ssubmissionthattheconstitutionisthesupremelawofthe landperArticle2thereof,itstandstoreasonthatSection9oftheACA cannotoperateto ousttheconstitutionallyestablished judicialreview jurisdictionoftheHighCourt. Inthisconnection,werelyontheauthorityin thecaseofFr. FrancisBahikirweMuntu&15Ors.v. KyambogoUniversity– Misc. ApplicationNo.643of2005(Unreported),whereHon. Mr. Justice RemmyKasuleheldthusatpg.7;(Refertothehighlightedportionofacopy thereofattachedandmarked'A1'),

"Therighttoapplyforjudicialreview isnow ConstitutionalinUganda. Article42givesone,beforeanadministrativeofficialorbody,arighttobe

treated fairly with a right to apply to a court of law regarding an administrative decision taken against such a one. The right to just and fair *treatment cannot be derogated according to Article 44..."*

In addition, regarding the import and effect of Section 9 of the ACA vis-à-vis the matter now before court, it is a long established principle of the Common law that an *'ouster clause'* such as that embedded in Section 9 of the ACA cannot and does not operate to oust the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review where the subject matter of the complaint is an *ultra vires* decision and therefore a nullity in law. In support of this view, we rely on the passages appearing at pgs. 272 – 282 of the legal text entitled 'Judicial Review, Law Procedure and Practice, 2^nd Ed. Peter Kaluma, Law Africa.

The applicant's case is that the 1^st respondent acted unlawfully and/or illegally in entertaining and rendering a decision on the applicant's application for appointment of an Arbitrator made *vide* CADER Misc. Application No. 67 of 2017.

It is not in dispute that applicant's application for appointment of an Arbitrator was made under the provisions of Section 11 of the ACA and Rule 13 of the Arbitration Rules. It is also not in dispute that the said application was received, exclusively entertained and decided upon by the 1^st respondent in his capacity as Executive Director of the 2^nd respondent.

It also appears from the averment in paragraph 6 of the 1^st respondent's affidavit in reply that he entertained the said application on the basis of some delegated authority of the $2^nd$ respondent under Section 68 of the ACA. However, it is not provided for anywhere in Section 68 that the $2^nd$ respondent can delegate its powers and functions to the 1^st respondent. This therefore is a clear admission of a breach of the Administrative law principle of '*delegatus non potest delegare*' which is to the effect that a person or body to whom parliament has delegated the exercise of statutory powers and functions cannot in turn delegate the exercise of such powers and function to another person or body. On this score alone, the decision and all actions of the 1^st respondent in relation to CADER Misc. Appn. No. 67 of 2017 are null and void.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction to entertain an application for appointment of an Arbitrator under the ACA vests exclusively in the $2^nd$ respondent and/or an "appointing authority" by virtue of Sections 67 (1), 68 (a), 11 (3) (a) (b), (4) of the ACA. An "appointing authority" is defined under Section 2 (1) (a) to mean 'an institution, body or person appointed by the Minister to perform *the functions of appointing arbitrators and conciliators.* The 1^st respondent is clearly different from the $2^nd$ respondent and he is not an appointing authority within the meaning of the ACA. At all material times hereto, the 1^st respondent has served and continues to serve in the office of the Executive Director of the $2^nd$ respondent. That office is established under Section 70 (1) of the Arbitration Act and the functions thereof as per Section 70 (2) are restricted to acting as the administrative officer of the $2^nd$ respondent charged with the day-to-day operations of the 2^nd respondent.

The present application as rightly pointed out by the applicant's counsel is for judicial review orders against the decision of the 1^st respondent in appointing an arbitrator. The applicant is questioning the powers to appoint an arbitrator which in my view is about wrongful exercise of power as provided under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

The wrongful exercise of any power by the Executive Director or CADER can be brought into question by way of judicial review. The exercise of power by persons not authorized by the Act can indeed be a subject of judicial review and does not in any way conflict with section 9 which bars intervention in matters governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It therefore follows that Arbitration must be carried out in a way that is consistent with Constitutional principles and values and any derogation thereof may be challenged as being unconstitutional and thus invalid.

Whereas it is true that Arbitration and Conciliation Act generally provides for limited rights of courts intervention in matters governed by the Act, there may be instances and circumstances that may warrant court's intervention. For example, the Court may intervene on grounds of public interest if substantial injustice is likely to be occasioned.

While the State should continue to respect the role of private Arbitration and the need to avoid recourse to the courts in private dispute settlement, they must not permit private arbitrators to use laws that are likely to violate constitutional principles and other laws of the land. In the case of Sadrudin Kurji& another v. Shalimar Limited & 2 Others [2006] eKLR the Court held *inter alia* that:

"... Arbitration process as provided for by the Arbitration Act is intended to facilitate a quicker method of settling disputes without undue regard to technicalities. This however, does not mean that the courts will stand and watch helplessly where cardinal rules of natural justice are being breached by the process of Arbitration. Hence, in exceptional cases in which the rules are not adhered to, the courts will be perfectly entitled to set in and correct obvious errors."

It therefore follows that Arbitration must be carried out in a way that is consistent with Constitutional principles and values and any derogation thereof may be challenged as being unconstitutional and thus invalid.

This court has jurisdiction under judicial review to question the actions of the $1^{st}$ and $2^{nd}$ respondent derived from the Arbitration and Conciliation Act or which may be in contravention of the Constitution.

This issue is resolved in the affirmative.

ISSUE 2

Whether or not the application is properly brought against the 3^rd respondent?

The 3^rd respondent's counsel submitted that this Application is incompetent and unsustainable as against the 3^rd Respondent for the following reasons:

- The 3^rd Respondent is not a public officer or public institution and is therefore not amenable to judicial review. - The Application was brought against the 3^rd Respondent in his personal private capacity instead of bringing the application in his capacity as the Arbitrator. - The 3^rd Respondent being an Arbitrator was a person acting judicially and was therefore granted immunity from civil actions by statute. - In any event even if, the 3^rd Respondent made any decision as Arbitrator, the decision is not subject to judicial review.

● JudicialreviewisnotavailabletoalitigantsuchastheApplicantwho hasalternativeremedies.

The3rd respondent'scounselcontendedthatthe3rd Respondentisnota properpartytotheproceedingsbeforeCourt. InthisApplication,the3rd Respondentisreferredtoas"RajeshDewani"andtheApplicantpurportsto havecommencedthisactionagainsthiminthatcapacity.

RegardingthepersonsandbodiesamenabletoJudicialreviewthelearned authorSsekaanaMusa,PublicLaw inEastAfrica,37(2009)LawAfrica Publishing,NairobiatP.37stated:

"Thepurposeofjudicialreviewistocheckthatpublicbodiesdonotexceed theirjurisdictionandcarryouttheirdutiesinamannerthatisdetrimentalto thepublicatlarge. Judicialreviewisonlyavailableagainstapublicbodyin apubliclawmatter. Inessence,tworequirementsneedtobesatisfied;first, thebodyunderchallengemustbeapublicbodywhoseactivitiescanbe controlledbyjudicialreview. Secondly,thesubjectmatterofthechallenge must involve claims based on public law principles and not the enforcementofprivatelawrights".

Thepositionpostulatedbythelearnedauthorabovewasadoptedand followed by Hon. Justice Stephen Mubiru in ARUA KUBALA PARK OPERATORSANDMARKETVENDORSCOOPERATIVESOCIETYLTD–V-ARUAMUNICIPALCOUNCIL,AruaHighCourtMisc. CauseNo.0003of 20116(unreported)whilecommentingonthepurposeofjudicialreview statedatP.3ofhisruling.

The3rdRespondentisnotapublicofficeranddoesnotexerciseanypublic functions. Theapplicationdidnotciteanyexerciseofapublicfunctionthat wasundertakenbythe3rd Respondentinthismatter. Consequentlythe applicationasbroughtagainstthe3rdRespondentinhisindividualcapacity isincompetentandshouldonthisgroundbedismissed.

Theapplicant'scounselsubmittedthatthe3rdrespondentwasanecessary partytotheapplicationandtheapplicationisnotseekingjudicialreviewof anydecisionoractiontakenbythe3rdrespondentbutratherthatbecause ofthenatureofthereliefssoughtagainstthe1stand2nd respondents consideredtogetherwiththefactthatifthoseremediesweregranted,they

wouldaffectthe3rdrespondent'stitleasanappointedArbitratorandindeed anythingdoneorcarriedoutbyhiminthatcapacity.

Modernconventionallegalpracticedictatesthatwhereanycourtactionis likelytoaffectanyotherperson'srightsortitle,suchotherpersonoughtto bejoinedintheactionandaffordedtherighttobeheardbeforeadecision inthematterisarrivedat. Todootherwisewouldcertainlyqualifyas condemningapartyunheardandthereforeunconstitutional.

Itwascounsel'sview,thattheuseofthephrase'anyperson'inthetextof both rules also covers persons who whereas they are notordinary amenabletojudicialreview,theyareneverthelessmaterialtoaproperand conclusivedeterminationofthemattersincontroversyinajudicialreview application.

Theoverridingconsiderationhereiswhetherinthecircumstancesofthe case,the3rdrespondentwasnecessaryand/oraproperpartytobejoined intheactionsoastoenablethecourttoproperlyandeffectuallyadjudicate onallthemattersinissueandsoastoavoidamultiplicityofsuits?

Theapplicanthadrequestedthe3rdrespondenttohaltproceedingsinthe matterpendingtheapplicant'sapplicationforjudicialreview. Hedeclined andinsteadproceededtotakestepswhoseeffectwouldbetoexposethe applicantto certain attendantliabilitiessuch asdetermination ofthe disputeinitsabsenceandthepossibilityofmakinganawardagainstit.

Thejoinderofthe3rd respondentasthepersonwhowaslikelytobe affectedbythedecisionthatwouldbearrivedatbythecourtwasproper eventhoughhewasnotinvolvedindecisionmakingprocessthatledtohis appointment.

Inaddition,thefactthe3rdrespondenthadtakenuptheresponsibilityasan Arbitrator,itwasjustifiablethathebejoinedasapartyinordertorestrain him from continuingwiththeintendedarbitrationproceedingsthatwhere underchallengeincourt. The3rdrespondentwasanessentialpartytobring beforethecourtintheseproceedingsinordertoconfirm thedecisionthat hadbeenmadebythe1strespondent.

Apartymaybejoinedinasuitnotbecausethereisacauseofaction againstit,butbecausethatparty'spresenceisnecessaryinordertoenable the courteffectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questionsinvolvedinthecauseormatter. SeeDepartedAsianProperty CustodianBoardvsJafferBrothersLtd[1999]1EA55

TheapplicantsoughtanOrderofcertioraritoquashtheproceedings,ruling andordersmadeasaresultofwhichthe3rdrespondentwasappointedan Arbitratorandalsoadeclarationthattheappointmentisnullandvoidab initio.

The applicantalso soughtspecific orders againstactions ofthe 3rd respondent;

- ● Adeclarationthatalltheactsanddeedscommencedand/orcarried onbythe3rd respondentpursuanttohisaforesaidappointmentasan Arbitratorarenullandvoidandofnolegaleffect. - ● Apermanentinjunctionbeissuedtorestrainthe3rd respondentfrom continuingtocarryonthefunctionsofanArbitratorpursuanttohis aforesaidappointment.

The3rd respondentwasanindispensablepartywhoseparticipationwas requiredforpurposesofrenderingajudgmentandhisrights(appointment) wouldbedirectlyaffectedbythedispositionofthecase.

Thenatureoftheorderssoughtrequiredthepresenceofthe3rdrespondent inordernottobecondemnedunheardcontrarytotheConstitution.

Thisissueisresolvedintheaffirmative. ISSUE3&4

Whethertherulingandordersofthe1strespondentinCADERMisc. Appn. No.67of2017areamenabletojudicialreview?

Whetherornotthe1strespondentactedlawfullywhenheentertainedthe applicationtoappointanarbitrator?

The applicant's counsel argued the $3^{rd}$ and $4^{th}$ issues together and equally relied upon the earlier submissions on the $1^{st}$ issue. He reiterated that $1^{st}$ respondent acted unlawfully and/or illegally when he entertained the applicant's application for the appointment of an Arbitrator *vide* CADER Misc. Appn. No. 67 of 2017.

The applicant's counsel further submitted that the ruling and orders of the 1^st respondent in CADER Misc. Appn. No. 67 of 2017 are amenable to judicial review on grounds of illegality. He cited the case of *Ntinda New* Market Property Owners Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Uganda Land *Commission & 3 Ors. - High Court Misc. Cause No. 27 of 2011 (Unreported).* In that case, Hon. Lady Justice Lydia Mugambe held that;

"... Judicial Review is the process by which the High Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or who are engaged in the performance of public acts and duties..."

In the same case, her Lordship reaffirmed the holding in the authority of Koluo Joseph Andrew & Others v. Attorney General and Ors. - Misc. Cause No. 106 of 2010 where it was held thus;

"The purpose of Judicial Review is concerned not with the decision but with the decision making process. Essentially, Judicial Review involves an assessment of the manner in which a decision is made. It is not an appeal and the jurisdiction is exercised in a supervisory manner, not to vindicate rights as such but to ensure that public powers are exercised in accordance with the basic standards of legality, fairness and rationality."

As already pointed out above, in entertaining CADER Misc. Appn. No. 67 of 2017, the 1^st respondent was acting in his capacity as the Executive Director of the $2^{nd}$ respondent. That office is established by Sections 69 (3) (b) of the ACA which empowers the council in its capacity as the governing body of the $2^{nd}$ respondent, to appoint the Executive Director 'on such terms and conditions as the council may determine.' The Executive Director is also a member of the secretariat and also the administrative officer of the 2^nd respondent charged with the responsibility of handling the day-to-day operations of the $2^nd$ respondent per Section 70 (1) and 70 (2) of the ACA.

The2ndrespondentontheotherhandisacreatureofSection67(1)&(2)of theACA. Thefunctionsofthe2ndrespondentarespeltoutinSection68(a) –(l). Section68(a)empowersthe2ndrespondenttoperform thefunctions referredtoinSections11,12,13,14,15and51. Onesuchfunctionisthatof appointmentofArbitratorsisprovidedforunderSection11(3)(a)(b)and (4)(a)(b)(c).

Accordingly,the1strespondentasExecutiveDirectorand2nd respondent arebothcreaturesoftheACA. The2ndrespondentistherebyvestedwith powertocarryoutcertainquasi-judicialandotherfunctions/actsofa public nature. The 1st respondentas Executive Directorofthe 2nd respondentisalsoamemberofitssecretariatinchargeofitsday-to-day affairs. Inlinewiththeiraforesaidcapacities,theactsand/oromissionsof the1stand2ndrespondentsinconnectionwiththeapplicant'sapplication fortheappointmentofanArbitratorvideCADERMisc. Appn. No.67of2017 arethereforeamenabletojudicialreview.

The1stand2ndrespondent'scounselsubmittedthattheirindulgencewas foundeduponthefailurebytheapplicantandAECOM toappointinterpartiesanArbitratorpursuanttotheiragreementtoarbitrateaspertheir agreement.

Thattheapplicantinvokedsection11(4)oftheArbitrationandConciliation Actwhichprovidesthatanypartymayapplytotheappointingauthorityto takenecessarymeasures,unlesstheagreementotherwiseprovides,for securingcompliancewiththeprocedureagreeduponbytheparties.

Counselcitedsection2oftheActreadtogetherwithsections67,and Sections67and68(a),(c),(j)and(l)ofthearbitrationActasthebasisfor authoritytoadjudicationinthematterthatresultedintheappointmentof anArbitrator.

HefurthersubmittedthatinUganda,the2ndrespondentisdesignatedasan appointingauthority,pursuanttosections11,12,13,14,15and51ofthe ArbitrationandConciliationAct.

Therespondent'scounselfurthercontendedthatinthecaseofUgandathe adjudication functions are designated to the 2nd respondent,whose functionsareperformedbytheExecutiveDirector(1strespondent)under Section68(a)and70(2)oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct.

Accordingtocounsel,noevidencehasbeenbroughttothisCourttodispel that1st and 2nd respondentsasthe "appointing authority"within the meaningofsection2(1)(a)oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct.

Theapplicant'scounselraisestwoissuesandorchallengestheactionsof the1strespondentasExecutiveDirectorforhavingtakendecisionson behalfofthe 2nd respondent-CADER which according to him is the appointingauthority.

Section2(1)(a)ofTheArbitrationandConciliationActprovidesasfollows;

"appointingauthority"meansaninstitution,bodyorpersonappointedby the Ministerto perform the functions ofappointing arbitrators and conciliators";

Theappointingauthorityisvestedwithpowertoappointarbitratorsunder section11oftheArbitrationandConciliationActasfollows;

11(3)provides; Where-

(a)Inthecaseofthreearbitrators,apartyfailstoappointthearbitrator withinthirtydaysafterreceiptofarequesttodosofrom theother partyofifthetwoarbitratorsfailtoagreeonthethirdarbitratorwithin thirtydaysaftertheirappointment;or

(b)Incaseofonearbitrator,thepartiesfailtoagreeonthearbitrator, the appointmentshallbe made,upon application ofa party,bythe appointingauthority.

11(4)provides;

Where,underaprocedureagreeduponbythepartiesfortheappointment ofanarbitratororarbitrators-

(a)Apartyfailstoactasrequiredunderthatprocedure;

- (b)Thepartiesortwoarbitratorsfailtoreachtheagreementexpectedof themunderthatprocedure;or - (c)Athirdparty,includinganinstitution,failstoperform anyfunction entrustedtoitunderthatprocedure,

Anypartymayapplytotheappointingauthoritytotakethenecessary measures,unless the agreement otherwise provides,for securing compliancewiththeprocedureagreeduponbytheparties.

11(5)provides;

^A decision ofthe appointing authorityin respectofa matterunder subsection(3)or(4)shallbefinalandnotbesubjecttoappeal.

11(6)provides;

Theappointingauthorityinappointinganarbitratorshallhavedueregardto anyqualificationsrequiredofanarbitratorbytheagreementoftheparties andsuchconsiderationsasarelikelytosecuretheappointmentofan independentandimpartialarbitrator.

Thefunctionsofthecentreareprovidedforundersection68which provides;

Thefunctionsofthecentreshall,inrelationtoarbitrationandconciliation proceedingsunderthisAct,includethefollowing-

(a)Toperformfunctionsreferredtoinsections11,12,13,14,15and51

Section69providesforthegoverningbodyoftheCentreforArbitrationand DisputeResolution;

(1)The governing body forthe centre forArbitration and Dispute resolutionshallbeacouncil.

(2)…………………………….

(3)Thecouncilshallconsistofthefollowing-

- (a)ThechairpersonappointedbytheMinisteronsuchtermsand conditionsastheMinistermaydetermine; - (b)Theexecutivedirectorofthecentreappointedbythecouncilon suchtermsandconditionsasthecouncilmaydetermine; - (c)ThepresidentoftheUgandaCommercialCourt; - (d)ThreerepresentativesappointedbytheMinisterfrom theexisting privatesectororganisationsortheirrepresentatives; - (e)ArepresentativeoftheUgandaLawSociety.

Itcanbediscernedfrom theaboveprovisionsthatindeedtheCentreand theExecutiveDirectorareverydifferentandthefunctionsoftheCentreare supposedtobeperformedbytheCouncil.

The1strespondentcannotusurpthepowersofthecentreandactinthe nameofthecentreandyetthefunctionisvestedinthegoverningcouncil. I agreewiththesubmissionoftheapplicantthatadelegatecannotsub delegate-delagatusnonpotestdelegare. Itmeansthatpowerconferredon aparticularpersonorbodymustbeexercisedbythatverypersonorbody. SeePublicLawinEastAfricabySsekaanaMpg109

Idonotagreewiththeargumentofthe1stand2ndrespondent'scounsel's argumentthatboththe1stand2nd respondentareappointingauthority withinthemeaningofsectionofsection2(1)(a)oftheArbitrationand ConciliationAct.

Apublicbodycouldonlydelegatepowersifitwasprovidedforinthe legislation thatcreated it. The 1st respondentin thismatteralleging delegation must adduce evidence to show that the responsible person/authorityhadeitherexpresslyorimpliedlydelegatedoneormoreof itsfunctions.

Indeterminingwhetherastatuteshouldbeinterpretedasauthorisingor prohibitingaparticularactofdelegation,thecourtshadcommonlytakena particularstrictviewinrelationtothedelegationoffunctionsofajudicialor disciplinarynature,orwhere theyregarded the statutorilydesignated decisionmakerashavingbeenselectedbecausehewasespeciallysuited orqualifiedforthetask. SeeSuisseSecurityBankandTrustLimitedv FrancisBS2003SC63

Normallythecourtsarerigorousinrequiringthepowertobeexercisedby theprecisepersonorbodystatedinthestatute,andincondemningasultra vires action taken byagents,sub committees ordelegates,however expresslyauthorisedbytheauthorityendowedwiththepower. SeeH. W. R

Wade&C. F. ForsythAdministrativeLaw10thEdition2009pg260.

The1strespondenthasnotadducedanyevidenceofdelegationofsuch functiontohim astheExecutiveDirectorsincehisroleandfunctionsare confinedtothedaytodayoperationsofthecentreundersection70(2)of theArbitrationandConciliationAct.

Theauthority/bodyconferredwithpowerisnotallowedtodelegatethe exercisepowertosomeoneelse,becausethatwouldbecontrarytothe intentionofParliamentasexpressedinthewordsoftheAct. IfParliament had wanted thatotherperson to exercise the power,itwould have conferredpoweronthem.

Thefunctionofappointingarbitratorsandconciliatorsisoneofthekeyand corefunctionsforwhichtheActwasenacted. Anyattempttodelegatesuch animportantfunctionwouldbeultravirestheAct.

Thefunctionofappointingarbitratorsandconciliatorsissoimportantthat itwouldbeequatedtoappointingjudicialofficerswhichcouldnotbe delegatedorvestedinasoleindividual-ExecutiveDirector.

Theactionofthe1strespondentappointinganArbitratorinCADERMisc. Appn. No.67of2017asifhewastheCentrewasultravirestheArbitrations andConciliationActandhenceillegal.

Inthesamevein,section2(1)(a)ascitedhereinbeforedefinesappointing authorityasInstitution,bodyorpersonappointedbytheMinister.

TheCentreasconstitutedbythelawisnotwhollyappointedbytheMinister asthesection2(1)(a)envisages. TheMinisterappointsthechairpersonand threerepresentativesfrom theexistingprivatesector. Theotherthree membersareappointedbydifferentauthoritiesandthereforetheycannot bedeemedtobeappointedbytheMinisterinordertoconform tothe definitionof"appointingauthority".

TheMinistershouldthereforeformallyappointthegoverningcouncilof CADERasthe"appointingauthority"fortheArbitratorsandConciliatorsas

theInterpretationsectiondefinesit. Alternatively,thedefinition"appointing authority"shouldberedefinedtogiveapropermeaningtothewholeAct.

ThiscourtcannotusurpthefunctionsoftheLegislature,sincethecourt cannotlegislateonthesubjectundertheguiseofinterpretationagainstthe willexpressedintheenactment. Itshouldnotbeopentothecourttoplace anunnaturalinterpretationonthelanguageusedbythelegislatureand imputetoitanintentionwhichcannotbeinferredfrom thelanguageused byitbybasingonideasderivedfromotherlaws.

Themeaningof"appointingauthority"willcausefurtherconfusioninthe interpretationandapplicationofthewholeActanditmayinvitefurther litigation.

Whatremediesareavailabletotheparties?

Theever-wideningscopegiventojudicialreviewbythecourtshascauseda shiftinthetraditionalunderstandingofwhattheprerogativewritswere designedfor. Forexample,whereascertiorariwasdesignedtoquasha decisionfoundedonexcessofpower,thecourtsmaynowrefusearemedy ifto grantone would be detrimentalto good administration,thus recognisinggreaterorwiderdiscretionthanbeforeorwouldaffectinnocent thirdparties.

Thegrantofjudicialreviewremediesremainsdiscretionaryanditdoesnot automaticallyfollow thatiftherearegroundsofreview toquestionany decisionoractionoromission,thenthecourtshouldissueanyremedies available. Thecourtmaynotgrantanysuchremediesevenwherethe applicantmayhaveastrongcaseonthemerits,sothecourtswouldweigh variousfactorstodeterminewhethertheyshouldlieinanyparticularcase. SeeRvsAstonUniversitySenateexpRoffey[1969]2QB558,Rvs SecretaryofStateforHealthexpFurneaux[1994]2AllER652

Certiorari

Anorderofcertiorariissuestoquashtheproceedings,rulingandorders arisingfromCADERMisc. Appn. No.67of2017forillegality.

Declaration

- The 1st respondent's appointmentofthe 3rd respondentas an Arbitratorpursuanttotherulingandordersofthe1strespondentvide CADERMisc. Appn. No.67of2017isnullandvoid. - The1strespondentcannotexercisethefunctionsofan'appointing authority'underthe Arbitration and Conciliation Actto appoint ArbitratorsandConciliators.

Mandamus

AnorderofMandamusissuesdirectingtheGoverningCounciloftheCentre forArbitration and Dispute Resolution to appointarbitrator(s)in the CAD/ARB/67/2017:INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTCONSULTANTSLTD vsAECOMRoALTD.

SpecialandGeneraldamages

Theapplicantprayedforspecialandgeneraldamages. Injudicialreview courtdoesnotawardthosecategoriesofdamagesbutratherindeserving circumstanceswherethereisjustificationmayawarddamages.

Thehabitofseekingdamagesasifitisanautomaticrightinevery applicationforjudicialreview shouldbediscouraged. Judicialreview is moreconcernedwithcorrectingpublicwrongsandnotdemandorseekto recoverdamages.

Anindividualmayseekcompensationagainstpublicbodiesforharm causedbythewrongfulactsofsuchbodies. Suchclaimsmayariseoutof theexerciseofstatutoryorotherpublicpowersbystatutorybodies.

Thefactthatanactisultraviresdoesnotofitselfentitletheindividualsfor anylosssuffered. Anindividualmustestablishthattheunlawfulactionalso constitutesarecognizabletortorinvolvesabreachofcontract. SeePublic LawinEastAfricabySsekaanaMusapg245-249

Thenatureofdamageenvisagedisnotnecessarilycategorizedasspecial orgeneraldamage. Butsuchdamageisawardedformisfeasanceor nonfeasanceforfailuretoperformadutyimposedbylaw.

Thetortofmisfeasanceinpublicofficeincludesmaliciousabuseofpower, deliberatemaladministrationandperhapsalsootherunlawfulactscausing injury.

Theapplicanthasnotmadeoutanycaseforawardofdamages. No damagesareawarded.

Costs

Inthefinalresult,thisapplicationisallowedwithnoorderastocosts. Each partyshallbearitscosts. Thisisamatterofpublicinterestandthedispute betweenthepartiesisyettobedetermined. Itisonlyfairthatnoorderis madeastocosts.

Isoorder.

SSEKAANAMUSA JUDGE 1st/03/2019