Download

Uganda Judgment

East African Court of Appeal

Anand v Public Trustee of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya (Civil Case No. 110 of 1942) [1944] EACA 21 (1 January 1944)

On this page

Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The court held that, although an action in tort could not lie against the estate of the deceased owner-driver due to the principle actio personalis cum persona mortitur, an action for breach of contract was maintainable. The contract of carriage between the plaintiff and the deceased included an implied term that the owner-driver would exercise due care, skill, and foresight. The evidence established a breach of this implied term, resulting in serious injury to the plaintiff. The court applied the principle of restitutio in integrum, awarding damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, permanent partial disability, loss of expectation of life, and loss of earning capacity. Expenses deemed too remote, such as the plaintiff's journey to India, were excluded. The total damages awarded were Sh. 31,200 plus costs.

Court disposition

judgment_for_plaintiff

Orders

  • Judgment for the plaintiff for Sh. 31,200 and costs.
  • Medical expenses of Sh. 1,200 allowed.
  • Damages for pain and suffering, permanent partial disability, loss of expectation of life, and loss of earning capacity assessed at Sh. 30,000.

02

Material facts

Parties

Sewa Ram Anand

Plaintiff Counsel: Archer

The Public Trustee of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya as Administrator of the estate of Chanan Ram s/o Diwan, deceased

Defendant Counsel: Burke

Amounts and remedies

  • Medical Expenses: KES 1,200
  • Pain and Suffering, Permanent Partial Disability, Loss of Expectation of Life: KES 25,000
  • Loss of Business and Earning Capacity: KES 5,000
  • Total Damages Awarded: KES 31,200

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Civil Suit / Judgment

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The plaintiff argued that there was a contract of carriage with the deceased owner-driver, which included an implied term that the owner-driver would exercise due care, skill, and foresight. The breach of this implied term resulted in serious injury to the plaintiff, entitling him to damages for pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and general incapacity. The plaintiff claimed both actual expenses and general damages arising directly from the breach.
Respondent
The defendant contended that the action, though claimed to be in contract, was in fact in tort, and that general damages are not recoverable in contract. The defendant also argued that the measure of damages in contract is less than those recoverable in tort and that certain expenses, such as the plaintiff's journey to India, were too remote to be recoverable.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Common law principle

    Actio personalis cum persona mortitur prevents tort actions against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor unless abrogated by statute.

  2. 02

    Admitted in pleadings; general contract law

    A contract of carriage contains an implied term that the carrier will exercise due care, skill, and foresight in carrying the passenger.

  3. 03

    10 Hailsham; Wilson v. New Dock Company (1866) 1 Exch. 177; The Argentino (1888) 13 P.D. 191

    Damages for breach of contract should place the injured party, as far as possible, in the position he would have been in had the breach not occurred (restitutio in integrum).

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court held that, although an action in tort could not lie against the estate of the deceased owner-driver due to the principle actio personalis cum persona mortitur, an action for breach of contract was maintainable. The contract of carriage between the plaintiff and the deceased included an implied term that the owner-driver would exercise due care, skill, and foresight. The evidence established a breach of this implied term, resulting in serious injury to the plaintiff. The court applied the principle of restitutio in integrum, awarding damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, permanent partial disability, loss of expectation of life, and loss of earning capacity. Expenses deemed too remote, such as the plaintiff's journey to India, were excluded. The total damages awarded were Sh. 31,200 plus costs.

Obiter and limits

  • If it were necessary to consider the question of negligence, the evidence would support a finding of sole negligence on the part of the owner-driver.
  • The use of the term 'general damages' in the context of contract refers to damages arising directly out of the breach, assessed by the court, as opposed to liquidated amounts.
  • The cost of the plaintiff's journey to India and his sojourn there is too remote and does not come within the principle of damages recoverable for breach of contract.

Court disposition

judgment_for_plaintiff

  • Judgment for the plaintiff for Sh. 31,200 and costs.
  • Medical expenses of Sh. 1,200 allowed.
  • Damages for pain and suffering, permanent partial disability, loss of expectation of life, and loss of earning capacity assessed at Sh. 30,000.

Source and reliance status

East African Court of Appeal

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Source document

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

East African Court of Appeal

Judgment

[1944] EACA 21

ORIGINAL CIVIL $\mathbf{X} = \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{X} + \frac{$

Before LUCIE-SMITH, J.

SEWA RAM ANAND, Plaintiff

$\mathbf{1}$

THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA as Administrator of the estate of CHANAN RAM s/o DIWAN. deceased. Defendant

Civil Case No. 110 of 1942

Carriage of passenger-Implied term of contract-Breach-Death of contractor owing to breach—Claim against estate—Damages.

The facts sufficiently appear from the judgment.

Held (30-3-44).—That an action for damages for breach of an implied term of the contract lies against the estate of the deceased contractor.

Archer for the Plaintiff.

Burke for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT.—On 5th March, 1941, the plaintiff was a fare-paying passenger in a taxi lorry belonging to one Chanan Ram s/o Diwan now deceased. This lorry ran a regular passenger service between Eldoret and Kitale as is evidenced by the witnesses Dourado and Wainana.

On the day in question this lorry with the plaintiff in it as a passenger was being driven by the owner of the lorry from Eldoret to Kitale, when the lorry came into collision with a railway engine at a level-crossing some three to four miles from Eldoret. What happened immediately before the crash is graphically described by Dourado. The driver of the engine also has told us what he knows about the accident. The scene of the accident is well shown by the photographs put in Exhibits CR 1, 3, 5 and 6. As a result of the collision the plaintiff was seriously injured.

This action cannot lie in tort, because of the principle Actio personalis cum persona mortitur, as the alleged tortfeasor himself, Chanan Ram, was killed as a result of the collision. This Colony has not yet amended its laws abrogating that principle, as has been done in England. However, were it necessary to consider the question of negligence, I should, from the evidence, unhesitatingly hold that the collision was due solely to the negligence of the owner-driver of the lorry.

The action has been brought in contract against the Public Trustee of the Colony as administrator of the estate of Chanan Ram s/o Diwan, deceased.

Mr. Burke for the defendant has contended that though the action is claimed to be in contract it is in fact in tort and points out the fact that general damages are claimed. It is true that in contract-a-claim for general damages as such will not lie but I think that the use of the words "general damages" in the present context refers to those damages arising directly out of the breach and which have to be assessed by the Court as opposed to liquidated amounts such as doctors' and hospital bills.

From the evidence I hold, that there was a contract of carriage between the plaintiff and the deceased owner-driver and that one of the conditions of the contract was that the owner-driver would exercise due care, skill and foresight in carrying the plaintiff to his destination. The defendant by paragraph 8 of his defence admits that if there was a contract of carriage as the plaintiff alleges, there was also an implied term that the owner-driver was to exercise due care, skill and foresight in carrying the plaintiff to his destination. I hold upon the facts that there was a breach of that implied undertaking.

I hold therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed. The question remains then—to what damage is the plaintiff entitled?

Mr. Burke has submitted that the measure of damages in the case of a breach of contract is different from and less than those recoverable in tort. However that may be the principle is that the injured party is entitled to *restitutio in integrum* that is to be placed so far as is possible, in the same position as if the wrong (whether arising out of tort or breach of contract) had not been committed. This appears to be the underlying principle set out in 10 Hailsham at pp. 82 (sections 100, 101), 84 (section 102), 90 (section 115) and 119 (section 150).

On this question of damages I would refer to the dictum of Martyn, B. in Wilson v. New Dock Company (1866) 1 Exch. 177 "The question of damages is of constant recurrence. It occurs in almost every action of contract except contracts for payment of a certain fixed sum of money and necessarily in every action for a wrong... the rule is that the damage must be proximate (not immediate) and fairly and reasonably connected with the breach of contract or wrong".

In *The Argentino* (1888) 13 P. D. 191 Bowen, L. J., said "Speaking generally" as to all wrongful acts whatever arising out of tort or breach of contract, the English law only adopts the principle of restitutio in integrum, etc."

In my opinion the plaintiff besides the actual expenses incurred as a result of the owner-driver's breach of contract is entitled to damages in respect of pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and general incapacity, and that these may be said fairly and reasonably to arise naturally from the breach of contract.

I am of opinion that the cost of the plaintiff's journey to India and his sojourn there is too remote and does not come within the above-quoted principle-I therefore exclude that part of the claim.

The only evidence I have as to medical expenses puts the figure at Sh. 1,200 and I allow that amount.

Damages for pain and suffering—loss of earning capacity—general incapacity and loss of expectation of life are difficult of assessment but in view of the medical evidence and the percentage of incapacity deposed to by Dr. Carothers $\hat{I}$ consider that a sum of Sh. 30,000 is a fair assessment. Were I asked to apportion this amount I would apportion Sh. 25,000 to pain and suffering-permanent partial disability to the extent of 80 per cent and loss of expectation of life and the balance of Sh. 5,000 to loss of business and loss of earning capacity.

There will be judgment for the plaintiff for Sh. 31,200 and costs.

$\overline{a}$

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Wilson v. New Dock Company (1866) 1 Exch. 177

Case cited

The Argentino (1888) 13 P.D. 191

Case cited

Case-aware research

Ask AI about this case

The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.

About this JurisAssist collection

This page organizes the available case record for research. Verify quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the source document. Corrections can be reported to hello@esheria.ai.

Legal information, not legal advice. Research summaries do not replace the judgment.